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Abstract 
A contract is considered incomplete when the optimal solution for a contractual problem 
requires some information from the parts which is not observable by one or both parts. This 
problem is found in the biodiesel production chain among small scale farmers and biodiesel 
companies in Brazil, which is regulated by a certification called Social Fuel Seal under the 
framework of the PNPB (Brazilian Program for Production and Use of Biodiesel). In order to 
minimize this hindrance, an incentive structure was elaborated utilizing the nonlinear 
programming. The Principal-Agent approach was used to verify if these new incentives allow 
for the small scale soybean farmer to put great effort level in the agricultural production. 
When the incentive structure is evaluated through the model proposed, the result indicates 
that both the farmer and the biodiesel company will have their profits maximized if the 
producer puts on great effort. Thus, it is clear the importance to include this mechanism of 
stimulation to productivity increase into the PNPB framework in order to contribute to the 
competitiveness of the Biodiesel chain in Brazil. 
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1 Introduction 
In developing countries, the agricultural contracts emerged after World War II for two main 
reasons. First, agribusiness corporations were forced to give up their land rights as a result of 
pressure from nationalists (WATTS, 1992), and second, farmers signed agreements through 
contracts with the promise of agricultural credit and modernization (CLAPP, 1988). 
However, contract in agriculture are generally incomplete and characterized by asymmetric 
information, which occurs when one party has privileged information (moral hazard). One 
way to minimize this problem in agricultural contracts and make the farmer (agent) act 
according to the objective of the employer (principal) is offering incentives. 
In the Brazilian agribusiness there are examples of chain organized under contract, e.g 
poultry, pig, orange, sugar-cane and tobacco production chain.  In the recently developed 
Brazilian biodiesel chain, negotiations between small scale farmers and biodiesel producers 
are defined by the Social Fuel Seal of the National Program for Production and Use of 
Biodiesel (PNPB). 
The Social Fuel Seal is a certificate granted by the Ministry of Agrarian Development to 
biodiesel producers who have spent from 15 to 30 percent of its total expenditure on the 
purchase of oilseed from small scale farmers or on the supply of input or service to these 
farmers through legally binding agreement. The contract has to be monitored by 
a recognized small scale farmer organizations and it has to safeguard the rural income and 
provide technical training and assistance to the farmers (Silva, 2012). 
By signing contracts with small scale soybean farmers, biodiesel companies establish various 
rules and regulations, such as quality and delivery scheme, but none relates to the provision 
Felippe Clemente and Aziz Galvão da Silva Júnior 
542 
of incentives for the agents. This lack of incentive mechanism enables opportunistic action 
by the agent and brings inefficiency to the system. Due to differences in productivity among 
soybean producers, a good system of agricultural incentives to minimize the moral hazard 
problem would be paying the small farmer according to productivity, encouraging him to 
perform an "extra effort" in soybean production. From this system of incentives, farmers can 
increase productivity (effort) to receive this incentive. “Effort” indicates that the farmer will 
probably deliver a greater quantity of soybeans for biodiesel companies, getting the price 
stated in the contract plus an incentives. On the other hand, no effort means the delivery of 
a smaller quantity of soybean, with the farmer receiving only the price agreed in the 
contract. 
Considering the structure of the Brazilian biodiesel production chain, the aim of this paper is 
to analyze the contractual relations between farmers and biodiesel companies under the 
National Program for Production and Use of Biodiesel. Specifically, it aims at: i) propose a 
system of incentives in contract farming that stimulates increased productivity of small scale 
soybean farms, ii) analyze the proposed new incentives for contracts between companies of 
biodiesel and soybean producers using the Principal-Agent approach to Moral Hazard, and 
iii) verify that the proposed new contracts encourage smallholders to implement high effort 
in soybean production under PNPB. 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
The Principal-Agent model is used in relationships where there is asymmetric information 
and the relationship between the economic agents is characterized by a Principal inducing 
(through a contract) an agent to perform certain actions. The Principal sets in the contract a 
"pay-off" to encourage the agent to act in the best possible way (MAS-COLELL, 1995). 
The Principal chooses a function y (.) that maximize their utility, subject to the restrictions 
imposed by the optimizing behavior of the agent, which are basically two: i) participation 
restriction (PR), and ii) Incentive Compatibility (RCI) (Sampaio, 2007). 
The general formulation of the Principal-Agent problem, based on Laffont (2002), for two 
players, consider A = set of actions the agent, S = set of possible outcomes. The agent takes 
actions belonging to the set, A = {a1, a2, ..., an} that produce a result "s" of the set S = {s1, 
s2, ..., sm} and occur with certain probability: 
 
𝜋n1, 𝜋n2, ..., 𝜋nm, such that ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑚𝑀𝑚=1 = 1. 
 
Thus, for each action "a" belongs to the set A, there is a probability distribution in S (ΠA).  If 
W is the amount paid for the service, it is assumed that the contract offered is a function W: 
S → R. That is, if "s" is observed, the principal pays W (s) to the agent, ie. the agent's 
remuneration is determined by the result of their actions. 
For the principal, a couple of "a" and "s" results in income B (a, s) and hence the profits of 
the principal are given by: B (a, s) - W (s). Thus, the expected profits of the principal can be 
written as: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑚(𝐵(𝑎𝑛, 𝑠𝑚) −  𝑊(𝑠𝑚))𝑀𝑚=1     (1) 
 
To agent, it is assumed a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u (W,). Since each 
agent has other alternatives that brings him a reserve utility, 𝑢,, he accepts a contract 
proposed by the principal if the inequality (2) holds: 
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𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑚𝑢(𝑤(𝑠𝑚),𝑎𝑛) ≥ 𝑢𝑀𝑚=1    (2) 
 
That is, participation restriction (PR) is satisfied when his expected utility of the chosen 
action (n) is greater than or equal to the expected utility of other actions available. 
Furthermore, the agent is induced to take the main action that maximizes their expected 
profits, satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint (RCI). For the chosen action an: 
 
∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑚𝑢(𝑊(𝑠𝑚) −  𝑑(𝑎𝑛)  ≥ 𝑀𝑚=1 ∑ 𝜋𝑛′𝑚𝑢�𝑊(𝑠𝑚)� − 𝑑(𝑎𝑛′) 𝑀𝑚=1   (3) 
 
Where in 
n’ = 1...N 
 
d is the “disutility” resulting from the execution of an action. 
 
Thus, for each W and each action an, has a payoff (pair of results to the principal and agent, 
respectively): 
 
∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑚(𝐵(𝑎𝑛, 𝑠𝑚) −  𝑊(𝑠𝑚))𝑀𝑚=1 ;  ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑚𝑢(𝑊(𝑠𝑚),𝑎𝑛) ≥ 𝑢𝑀𝑚=1    (4) 
 
Figure 1 shows how to obtain the solution of this game using the Nash Equilibrium in perfect 
subset. In the last stage, an agent chooses its action in order to comply with RCI, then 
observe whether their utility is greater than their expected utility. 
 
 
Figure 1. Principal-Agent game form 
Source: SAMPAIO (2007). 
 
The incentives to agents may be of several types, for example, higher rates of pay or 
bonuses, that depending on the type of activity and the established contract. 
Given the incentives, agents can spend a specific level of effort, low or high, and this decision 
will reflect in the result of its action. Furthermore, the agent is still subject to random factors 
that can positively influence (lucky) or negatively (unlucky) his result. 
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3 Analytical Framework 
3.1 Mathematical Model 
 
Aiming to offer an incentive structure for agricultural contracts between small scale soybean 
farmers and the biodiesel industry under the PNPB framework, a mathematical model was 
developed using a nonlinear programming technique. 
The objective function could be defined in several ways; maximizing the revenue of the firm, 
maximizing revenue of the farmer with fixed productivity or maximizing the farmer revenue 
with varied productivity. Following the proposal of Gibbons (1998) concerning the 
relationship between incentives and performance, it was chosen to maximize the farmer 
revenue with varied productivity. Thus, to run the model, the following input data were 
considered: 
 
Farmer revenue 
Total revenue (TR) per hectare of the small scale soybean farmer, considering the price of 
the soybean within a range of productivity (soybean per hectare). 
 
𝑅𝑇 = � (𝑃𝑆𝑘 𝑥 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘)4
𝑘=1
                                                                     (6) 
 
 
wherein 𝑃𝑆𝑘 is the price of soybean at the level of productivity k and 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘 is the quantity 
of soybean per hectare, according to the level k  of productivity. 
 
Price restriction 
For the price restriction it was considered the average price of soybean pays to small scale 
farmer under the PNPB framework as the minimum amount to be paid in each of the k levels 
of productivity per hectare. Moreover, the price paid must increase considering the 
increased productivity in order to make the model establishes a direct relationship between 
price and yield (similar to Gibbons (1998), incentive and performance). 
 
𝑃𝑆𝑘 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑘 = 0       (7) 
𝑃𝑆𝑘 > 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑘 = 1                                                     (8) 
𝑃𝑆4 > 𝑃𝑆3 > 𝑃𝑆2 > 𝑃𝑆1                                                                         (9) 
 
Productivity restriction 
We considered five levels of productivity per hectare being, 
 
         𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘 ≤ 𝑛0 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 0                                 (10) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘 ≤ 𝑛1 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑘 = 1                                                          (11)    
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘 ≤ 𝑛2 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑘 = 2                                                         (12)   
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘 ≤ 𝑛3 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑘 = 3                                                           (13)    
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘 > 𝑛4 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑘 = 4                                                          (14)   
𝑛4 > 𝑛3 > 𝑛2 > 𝑛1 > 𝑛0                                                                          (15) 
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wherein 𝑛𝑘 is the amount (kg) of soy produced per hectare. 
  
Total cost of production 
Defined as, 
 
𝐶𝑇 = � (𝐶𝑆𝑘 𝑥 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘4
𝑘=1
) ≤ 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛                                              (14) 
 
where, 𝐶𝑆𝑘 is the total cost of production per bag, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘 the level of productivity per 
hectare, and 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 the minimum average cost of small producers of soybeans. 
 
 
Model structure 
Therefore, we define the model used to generate optimal incentive structure for agricultural 
contracts. Structuring it in the conventional manner, we have 
 
Maximize                   𝑅𝑇 = � (𝑃𝑆𝑘 𝑥 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘)4
𝑘=1
 
Subject to 
 
               𝑃𝑆0 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒                                                        
               𝑃𝑆1 > 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒                                                        
   𝑃𝑆4 > 𝑃𝑆3 > 𝑃𝑆2 > 𝑃𝑆1                                 
  𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷0 ≤ 𝑛0                               
  𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷1 ≤ 𝑛1                               
 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷2 ≤ 𝑛2                               
 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷3 ≤ 𝑛3                                  
 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷4 > 𝑛4                                            𝐶𝑇 = � (𝐶𝑆𝑘 𝑥 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑘4
𝑘=1
) ≤ 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛              
 
3.2 Modeling of agricultural contracts 
In the contracts of purchase soybeans to produce biodiesel, the small scale  farmer is seen as 
hired (agent) by the producers of biodiesel (principal) and must deliver all production to the 
biodiesel company. This situation can be considered a Principal-Agent problem with hidden 
action. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the contracts involve the supply of 
inputs and technical assistance, as well as monitoring of the production process by the 
company. 
Considering different goals within the principal-agent approach, the problem is restricted to 
the reward structure that the company will propose to the producer. In Biodiesel Company, 
the principal wants to maximize it profits depend on the efforts applied by the farmers in the 
production, as well depending on random factors (states of nature) as rainfall, pest control, 
etc. Even monitoring the production, the company does not have complete information 
about the farmer and their effort levels. Therefore, the results (higher productivity per 
hectare) depend on the effort that held the producer and the states of nature. 
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Considering the state of nature there are situations in which the producer is "lucky" or 
"unlucky" in a given season, with its respective probabilities. 
 Thus, we can consider that the timing of the game is the following: a biodiesel company 
offers farmers a contract characterized by the level of effort and conditional payments to 
states of nature observed. Further, each agent performs the effort level chosen by the 
principal, considering the contract, and delivers the raw material produced to the company. 
Finally, the state of nature is observed by all and payments are made. 
 
The following table indicates the main data used in the model.  
 
Table 1. Main Data 
 
  
 Average soybean production cost 
 
  R$1 1.200/ha 
Quantity of oil extract per ton of soybean 
 
  190 kg 
Quantity of meal obtained per ton of soybean  
 
  760 kg 
Quantity of biodiesel produced (m3) per ton of soybean oil 1,0 m3 
Average price of meal per ton 
 
  R$ 734,17 
Industrial cost to extract the oil per ton of soybean    R$ 63,30 
Average price of biodiesel       R$ 2,43/l 
     1 R$ 1,00 around U$S 2,09  
Source: Projeto BiodieselUFV 
 
4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Optimized incentive 
The non-linear programming was used to propose an optimal incentive structure that 
maximizes the revenue of the family farmer soybean producer. Table 2 shows the results of 
the model. 
 
Table 2. Optimal incentive structure for the soybean contract 
Incentive Productivity 
R$ 0,000/bag 
R$ 0,598/bag 
below de 1600 kg/ha 
from 1600 to 2280 kg/ha 
R$ 0,603/bag from 2281 to 2340 kg/ha 
R$ 0,605/bag from 2341 to 2400 kg/ha 
R$ 0,608/bag More than 2401 kg/ha 
   Source: Results. 
 
The new incentive structure has increasing values, according to the performance of the small 
scale farmer. It is noteworthy that the purpose of this incentive is not to punish the producer 
less productive, but encourage him to seek technical assistance and follow the guidelines in 
order to achieve higher levels of productivity. Note that, as the difference in the amount 
paid by each stimulus level is small, the difference between the levels of productivity also 
shows modest, so that with small interventions in the form of production without major 
structural modifications costs, small farmers can now achieve a higher level and receive a 
greater benefit by bags produced. 
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4.2 Contract modelling 
The problem for the contractual scheme is restricted to the new system of incentives that 
the company will propose to the small scale farmers, since both have different objectives 
within the principal-agent system. The company in this case has interested that the yield 
obtained in each hectare planted by farmers is as high as possible, in order to maximize their 
profits, since a greater amount of vegetable oil can be processed into biodiesel and sold to 
ANP (Brazilian Agency for Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels) in the “biodiesel social seal” 
auctions, plus ensure the use of social label that gives also tax benefits. 
However, for this to be possible, it is necessary that the farmer (agent) performs efforts in 
the production process and get "lucky", ie, depends on both the commitment applied by 
farmers as the random factors (states of nature).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Principal-Agent game with incentive 
Source: Results. 
 
The solution to the game can be found using the reverse induction. Substituting the last 
lottery of Figure 2, corresponding to the possible states of nature, by their expected values, 
passes to the node t3, the agent will decide between two possible actions to be performed: 
high or low effort. At this point, the agent compares the expected utilities for the two cases, 
analyzing the difference in gain of the two alternatives, and thus decides what level of effort 
will employ, which maximize its utility. The small scale farmer actually will compare the 
utility of two possible actions, given its expected revenue according to the states of nature, 
and their efforts, ie, it compares the utility of applying high effort, 𝑢(𝑝(𝑠) ∗ 2.380,76 +
𝑝(𝑎) ∗ 1.664,62,𝑎1),with the utility to implement low effort, 𝑢(𝑝(𝑠) ∗ 175,22 + 𝑝(𝑎) −116,18, 𝑎2). 
The expected profits, in turn, depends directly on the probability for each state of nature. In 
this case, in the worst case, ie, when a farmer family has bad luck (unlucky) with a 100% 
chance (p (a) = 1), the difference between high and low effort applied is R$ 1,780.80 / ha (R$ 
 
R$ 13.368,18 (biodiesel company) 
R$1.664,62 /ha (farmer) 
R$ 16.868,65 (biodiesel company) 
R$ 2.380,76/ha (farmer) 
Pr t1 
w 
w' 
Several possible 
actions 
t2 
Ag 
A 
R 
t3 
Ag 
high 
low 
 N 
unlucky 
lucky 
R$ 6.486,34 (biodiesel company) 
R$ 175,22/ha (farmer) 
 
 N 
lucky 
unlucky 
R$ 5.400,32 (biodiesel company) 
R$ - 116,18/ha (farmer) 
 
ū = small scale farmes reserve utility is R$ 520,00/ha 
t4 
(ü; ū) 
 
t5 
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1,664.62 – (R$ -116.18), which represents a very significant for small scale soybean farmers. 
So the choice for the implementation of high effort becomes justifiable because the farmer 
receives a "prize" of R$ 1,780.80 / ha for the effort. 
After deciding for high effort, the agent passes to node t2, in which he will decide whether 
to accept or reject the contract offered by the company. He will accept it only if the 
expected utility of the chosen action is greater than or equal to the expected utility of other 
possible options, i.e., the level of utility allows the farmer's family, respecting the 
Participation Restriction. Small scale soybean farmers receive an average of R $ 520.00 / ha 
when selling to middlemen, who do not offer any bonuses or incentives. With this income 
(see t2) following the theoretical model, the agent will accept the proposed contract, since, 
at worst, the amount that will be received with the contract, to state the nature of chance, is 
$ 1,664.62 / ha, which is higher than the value of the utility reserves, according to the values 
stated in this paper. 
In t1, the principal chooses how much to pay for the family farmer, given the choices of the 
agent in t2 and t3, such that the payoff (expected profit) of principal is maximized. The 
question is whether the contract with incentives, he offered, is appropriate for each type of 
family farmers. For both, there are differences in company's earnings for each state of 
nature. If the status is "lucky", the company has a profit exceeding R$ 10,382.31 (R$ 
16,868.65 - R$ 6,486.34) if the family farmers apply high effort. If the state of nature is 
"unlucky", the company wins R$ 7, 967.86 more if the farmer opts for high effort. These 
values correspond to how the company could pay more for the effort of the family farmer. 
The new incentive structure proposed by the principal encourages the agent to implement 
high effort. Its decision to accept or reject the company's contract depended solely on the 
expected profits, levels of effort, its reserve utility and the state of nature. It is an advantage 
for the small scale farmer to enter into contract with the biodiesel company.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The National Program for Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB) is a biofuel program from 
the Brazilian government which has a social objective, ie, the inclusion of small scale 
farmers. 
Considering the usually contracts scheme for trading soybeans, it is noticed the absence of 
an incentive structure that encourages small scale farmers to achieve high effort. In order to 
minimize this obstacle, an incentive was proposed using the logic of non-linear programming 
in order to maximize the soybean farmers revenue.  
Using the principal agent model approach, the payoffs of the game indicate that both the 
farmer and the biodiesel company will maximized their profits with the action of high effort 
implemented by the farmer. A second game, considering no incentive, was run and showed 
that, although the contract without incentives and subsidies stimulate higher effort, the 
acceptance of contact proposed by the company is subject to the state of nature, which 
would make the negotiation unstable in the long run. Therefore, a contract with incentives is 
an important tool to induce farmers to produce with effort. But even knowing that this is the 
best way to be followed by the farmer, it can in fact be affected by some reasons that 
deserve attention. 
First, the gain that can be achieved when the farmer put high level of effort and has a 100% 
of “not lucky” is the limit that the farmer would be willing to participate in the contract. 
Another point to be noted is the small scale farmers low level of formal education, which can 
compromise the use of the full technical instructions. It is especially important when 
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considering other oleaginous production chain in Brazil (e.g Castor seed). This may imply 
that even if the farmer effort, he is not able to apply the recommended production 
techniques and get low-productivity. 
Furthermore, considering the importance of incentives for effective insertion of the small 
scale farmers in the biodiesel cahin, it is clear that the public agency responsible for the 
contract management of agricultural PNPB need to insert this mechanism in the PNPB social 
seal framework.  
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